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The aim of the article is to analyse the relations between the discursive Islamic tradition and the na-
tional policy implemented in various forms by the Palestinians. I will use in this analysis the notion 
of the Islamic discursive tradition of Talal Asad, which emphasizes the importance of the relation-
ship between power and knowledge. I will show how the Palestinian nationalist movement influ-
enced the perception of the role and significance of religious tradition, and how it is experienced 
and practiced in different ways. Works by John O. Voll, Daniel M. Varisco, Dale F. Eickelman, 
James P. Piscatori and Armand Salvatore show how the current understanding of the relationship 
between Islam and politics is dependent on Western, top-down assumptions and political projects, 
and how these have distorted understanding of the processes taking place in the so-called Muslim 
world. My aim is to go beyond these erroneous assumptions and to reinterpret the Palestinian expe-
rience of shaping the relationship between religion and politics.
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Outline of theory
The article focuses on the Palestinian experience of organizing the relationship be-
tween national politics and Islamic religious traditions. Modern researchers are mov-
ing away from using the supposedly universal concepts such as religion and secu-
larism in their analyses. In order to translate this complex problem into Palestinian 
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conditions, we must trace the problem of analysing Islam as an example of a religion 
in its universal meaning and the research problems resulting from this approach. 
For many years scholars have debated how to conceptualize Islam. Talal Asad of-
fered one of the best ways to do that, but we must bear in mind that it is not without 
its own problems. Asad views Islam as a discursive tradition, one that is dependent 
on the authority of a given community that interprets its values and principles, and on 
the history of that community. In his own words: “A tradition consists essentially of 
discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose 
of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history.”1 Palestin-
ians have developed their own Islamic practices and religious interpretations based 
on their own experiences which allow them to distinguish their religious practices 
from those of neighboring communities.2
Talal Asad rightly points out that the notion of religion and secularism were based 
mainly on Western and Christian experiences.3 The above concepts are also prob-
lematic and not so clear-cut in the Western context. As José Casanova explains, the 
privatization of religion, the differentiation among the secular spheres (state, science 
or economy), and finally the decline of religious beliefs and practices cannot be seen 
as a universal phenomenon that defines modern societies and modern socio-political 
developments. He describes multiple differentiations, secularizations, and moderni-
ties in the USA and Europe to show how problematic those universal definitions of 
religion and secularism are. He agrees with Talal Asad that secularization is not an 
emancipation of human life from “religion.”4 As Casanova writes “Asad has shown 
how ‘the historical process of secularization effects a remarkable ideological inver-
sion… For at one time the secular was a part of a theological discourse [saeculum],’ 
while later the religious is constituted by secular political and scientific discourses, 
so that religion itself as a historical category and as a universal globalized concept 
emerges as a construction of Western secular modernity.”5
It is imperative to point out that in the course of their history Muslim societies 
did not face the same circumstances as Europeans did during the Wars of Religion. 
Muslim societies did not have to tackle in the same way as European societies the 
question of relations between state power, political order, society, religion, their sep-
aration, etc.6 This is not to say, however, that the discussion has not been absent 
within Muslim communities. Since the beginning of Islam the discussion has re-
volved around the relation between the Ummah and religion itself, but it did not need 
a state to protect it or define it.7 The situation changed during the development of 
1 T. Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. Occasional papers series, Washington 1986, p. 14.
2 H. Gerber, Remembering and Imagining Palestine, New York 2008, p. 71.
3 T. Asad, Genealogies of Religion:Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Bal-
timore 1993.
4 J. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective, “The Hedgehog Re-
view” 2006, vol. 8, pp. 7–10.
5 Ibidem, p. 10.
6 N. Hashemi,  Islam and Democracy, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, J.L. Es-
posito, E. El-Din Shahin (eds.), New York 2013, p. 80.
7 P. Crone, Godʼs Rule: Government and Islam, Edinburgh 2004, pp. 261–284.
nationalisms in the Middle East, where as Ernest Dawn argues, nationalism evolved 
out of Islamic reforms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and out of dis-
cussions involving the relations among a particular Muslim (and Arab) society, state 
authority, and religion.8 It is then that various voices emerged with many interpre-
tations of how Muslim nations should carry themselves, and this time state power 
and the will of nations have become the center of discussion,9 which has since then 
revolved around nationalism, state, and religion. The question has emerged if Islam 
needs the state to prevail or not, or does the state need Islam to evolve and develop 
further. For some the state has come to be understood as a guarantor of religion, and 
attempts have risen to add explicitly Islamic dimensions to the state and political 
systems.10 There are attempts to homogenize Shari’a, as the state even interferes in 
the basic aspects of the nation’s private life, including the type of music that can be 
listened to, displaying feelings in public places, and what attire should be worn. Even 
zakat (charity), which traditionally has been an individual practice of a Muslim, is 
now compulsory in a few states (Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
and Yemen).
We must note the evolution of socio-political and cultural ideas in the modern 
Middle East. Religion and state relations (ad-din wa ad-dawla – “religion and state”) 
are much more problematic and complicated. Some groups strive for a direct connec-
tion of the idea of state and religion (“ad-din as ad-dawla” and “ad-dawla as ad-din”) 
while others present Islam (their own Muslim tradition) as a solution for a nation’s 
social problems; they do not strive to equate religion and state with each other, as 
John O. Voll presents in his article “Political Islam and the State.” In the article, he 
cites, for example, an exchange of ideas between Khalid Muhammad Khalid and Mu-
hammad al-Ghazali.11 A distinction has been made between the sovereignty of the na-
tion and the sovereignty of God. In the first case, it is the nation that determines the 
authority and role of the state, with religion relegated to moral guidance in the func-
tioning of the state. There are, however, socio-religious movements that believe that 
the sovereign reign belongs to God, and so the will of the nation is irrelevant. State 
institutions enable God to exercise this power. Religious and state authorities try to 
subordinate the reality of social life to their interpretation of Islam. This distinguishes 
nationalistic movements which recognize the importance of religion, its motivational 
forces and moral boundaries, from movements that negate national values and will, in 
favor of God’s will. The nationalist movements face the problem of determining the 
boundaries between state and religion. Most tensions occur in this sphere, which we 
will see in the example of Hamas movement.12 I argue that Hamas is not an Islamist 
8 C.E. Dawn, The Origins of Arab Nationalism, [in:] The Origins of Arab Nationalism, R. Khalidi, 
M. Muslih (eds.), New York 1991, pp. 3–30.
9 H.A. Jamsheer, Historia powstania islamu jako doktryny społeczno-politycznej, Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 85–160.
10 J.O. Voll, Political Islam and the State, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics, E. Sha-
hin (ed.), New York 2016, pp. 56–67. A.J. Sherman, Islamic Reform, Between Islamic Law and the Na-
tion-State, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Islam…, op. cit., pp. 42–55.
11 J.O. Voll, op. cit., p. 58.
12 Ibidem, pp. 56–68.
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text, but a nationalist movement, that sees in Islam, in the Palestinian Islamic dis-
cursive tradition, a solution to both the Israeli illegal occupation and the Palestinian 
social and political crisis.
The complexity of the relationship between nationalism and religion causes 
movements and parties like Hamas to be categorized as so-called Islamist groups 
and not as nationalist. There is no unambiguous definition of Islamism. Therefore, 
all movements and parties that use religious rhetoric to some degree are usually cat-
egorized as Islamist movements. Some scholars argue that the concept of Islamism 
is too politicized. Daniel Varisco indicates that Islamism is often mistakenly identi-
fied with violence and Islamist movements are equated with terrorist groups.13 He 
adds that a broad definition of Islamism allows many socio-political researchers and 
commentators to identify different extremist activities with Islam itself. Donald Em-
merson suggests modifying this concept. He proposes a more inclusive definition of 
Islamism based on the classic definition of James Piscatori. According to this defini-
tion, Islamists are Muslims who are involved in political activity to introduce what 
they call the Islamic agenda.14 Emmerson, however, encourages changing the concept 
of political action to public action to include the social activism that is essential 
for Islamism.15 Asef Bayat, in turn, points out that Islamist movements must be dis-
tinguished from the so-called Salafi movements, especially since the emergence of 
reform movements combine different attitudes within the overall Muslim narrative.16
Nationalists (politicians and activists) in the Middle East, in order to effectively 
differentiate themselves from competitive social and political movements, often use 
the division into secular and Islamist movements for their own ends. The two main 
Palestinian movements, Hamas and Fatah, represent the Palestinian nationalistic dis-
course, although they are based on different (but not mutually exclusive) cultural and 
social assumptions and use different mobilization methods. The Salafi groups present 
in Palestine can be categorized as Islamist movements. The basis of their activities, 
goals, and methodology is not only what they see as their Islamic tradition, but the 
main authority, sovereignty, is vested in God, not in the nation. These groups try to 
avoid political and nationalistic activities and narratives.17
13 D.M. Varisco, Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetoric, [in:] Islamism. Contested Perspec-
tives on Political Islam, R.C. Martin, A. Barzegar (eds.), Stanford 2010, p. 33.
14 D.K. Emmerson, Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity, [in:] Islamism. Contested Perspec-
tives…, op. cit., p. 27.
15 R.C. Martin, A. Barzegar,  Islamism. Contested Perspectives on Political Islam, Stanford 2010, 
pp. 17–47.
16 A. Bayat, What is Post-Islamism?, “ISIM” 2005, no. 16 (5), p. 5.
17 Kh. Hroub, Salafi Formations in Palestine and the Limits of a De-Palestinised Milieu, “Holy Land 
Studies” 2008, no. 7 (2), p. 157–179.
The developing relationship between religious tradition  
and nationalism within Palestinian national discourse
Since Palestinian nationalism developed at the turn of the twentieth century, it has 
appealed to both “secular” ideas, such as the Palestinian people’s natural right to 
independence as a nation, and to the heritage of Muslim and Christian traditions, 
underlining the historical and religious value of Palestine. The British authorities, as 
part of the British Mandate in Palestine, believed that it would be easier to control the 
local Palestinian population if they marginalized their nationalist activities (which 
they identified primarily with the secular sphere), and they decided to relegate all Pal-
estinian activities to the religious sphere. Palestinians, however, used this “religious” 
sphere to further develop their nationalistic discourse, in which they had the most 
freedom of expression.18 Hence, the Grand Mufti of Palestine Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 
who also represented the ideas of Arab nationalism, began to use the Palestinian Mus-
lim tradition as a motivating measure and as a language to unite all Palestinian na-
tionalists, regardless of political, class, and ideological affiliations.19 
It can be argued that Palestinian nationalism was the context for Islam, not vice 
versa. The independent Palestine was to become a guarantor of the preservation of 
a specific Muslim tradition (in the local dimension) and Islamic orthodoxy (in the 
international dimension). Islam was not the basis for a future state. Participation in 
the Islamic congresses by Arab nationalist associations such as Al-Fatat, Al-‘Ahd or 
members of the pan-Arab Independence Party (Hizb al-Istiqlal) proves that regardless 
of the narrative used, the basis of the agreement was Palestinian national rhetoric.20
In the analyses of Hamas emphasis is too often placed on its religious rheto-
ric, ignoring other forms of their narrative. The rivalry between Hamas and Fatah 
is most often presented as a rivalry between a religious movement and a secular 
movement (nationalist), and not between two nationalist movements with different 
national strategies.
It is worth emphasizing that Fatah, as a movement which from the very begin-
ning has argued that they represent the ideological, social and cultural eclecticism of 
Palestinians, did not avoid using the elements of the Muslim tradition in its national 
rhetoric. From the very beginning of his socio-political activity, Yasir Arafat used 
both “secular” arguments and elements of the Muslim tradition, to appeal to and 
motivate Palestinians.21 Arafat referred, for example, to famous figures in Muslim 
18 W.C. Matthews, Confronting an Empire. Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular 
Politics in Mandate Palestine, London 2006, pp. 30, 118–134. R.C. Rowlan, D.A Frank, Shared Land. 
Conflicting identity. Trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian Symbol Use, East Lansing 2002, pp. 77–81.
19 W.C. Matthews, op. cit.
20 A. Ayyad, Arab Nationalism and the Palestinians, 1850–1939, Jerusalem 1999, pp. 118–152; 
A.W. Kayyali, Palestine. A Modern History, London 1973, pp. 131–133; M. Hassassian, Palestine. Fac-
tionalism in the National Movement, Jerusalem1990, pp. 78–105; B. Kimmerling, J.S. Migdal, The Pal-
estinian People. A History, Cambridge 2003, pp. 67–135.
21 R. Israeli, From Oslo to Bethlehem: Arafat’s Islamic Message, “Journal of Church and State” 
2001, no. 43 (3), p. 428.
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historiography associated with Palestine. In interviews, he emphasized that the fig-
ures he most admired were the Prophet Muhammad and the second caliph ‘Umar 
Ibn al-Khattab.22 These arguments were intended to present the Palestine’s historic 
relations with Arab-Muslim culture and highlight modern Palestinian aspirations.23 
Many Fatah members were former members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which dur-
ing An-Nakba earned respect among the Palestinians, as a movement that defended 
and fought for the rights of the Palestinian people.24 However, in time, in response to 
the Brotherhood’s passivity in the fight against Israel, an Islamic Jihad was created 
in Gaza. The battalions of Islamic Jihad, founded by Bassam Sultan, had close ties to 
Fatah. Islamic Jihad enjoyed popularity even among left-wing Palestinians, who saw 
in recruitment to this group a chance to engage in military action against the Israeli 
occupation.25
The origins of Hamas are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has 
been marking its presence in Palestine for several decades,26 focusing on institutional 
activities (relief, education, etc.) and not engaging in armed struggle with Israel. Is-
rael even partially supported and financed their activities.27
The day after the beginning of the first Intifada, the main members of the Broth-
erhood in Gaza gathered in the house of Ahmed Yasin and began discussing the use 
of this situation in a social and political context. The policy of non-engagement of 
the military Brotherhood was not supported by the Palestinians. On the other hand, 
Hamas could not completely cut itself off from the Brotherhood because the Brother-
hood supported its political development. Hence Yasin’s idea about the rise of Hamas 
as a separate branch of the Brotherhood, which would take responsibility for partici-
pation in the Intifada.28 At first, Hamas did not take part in the Intifada. It started with 
calls to keep fasting and conduct prayers. It began its military operations in 1989.29
The Hamas Charter was created on 18 August 1988. As many Hamas members 
confirm, it was not (and still is not) a major and stable reference point for their 
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Background, op. cit., pp. 7–8.
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actions.30 Nevertheless, fragments of it are used by critics of Hamas. In addition, 
Hamas’s opponents primarily choose fragments referring to the Muslim tradition to 
emphasize that Hamas is purely a religious movement, not a national one, and is thus 
not worthy of engaging in the political and diplomatic spheres.31
The Charter32 begins with a verse of the Qur’an’s third Sura (verses 110–112), 
telling of the virtues of a Muslim nation that can distinguish good from evil. Then 
Hassan al-Banna is recalled (and defined as a martyr) as saying that Israel would 
continue to exist until Islam abrogates it, just as Israel annulled what was before, 
that is Palestine. This part of the Charter focuses on the Palestinian context and not 
the general Muslim context. It emphasizes the moral values of Islam that will help 
defeat the Israeli state. The Charter also cites the words of Amjad az-Zawawi, who 
calls each individual (Muslim) to take appropriate action. This call is a common ele-
ment of Palestinian nationalist discourse. Hamas departs from the policy of military 
non-engagement proclaimed by the Brotherhood, indicating the readiness of Pales-
tinians to take up the fight. Therefore, Hamas members used the above-mentioned 
content and statements to reduce the apparent narrative difference between them and 
the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the Charter, Islam is a mobilizing factor (for 
Arabs and Muslims) as well as a means to help achieve the goals of the Palestinian 
resistance movement. The first chapter of the Charter describes Islam as the system 
from which Hamas will draw its ideology, basic teachings, and views on the way of 
life. It emphasizes that Hamas is part of the Palestinian national movement (article 6). 
In article 7, the Charter states that all Muslims in the world can help fight. Another 
article compares the current struggle against the Zionist occupation to the national 
revolt of 1936 against the British Mandate, recalling the figure of Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam.
Article 11 presents the Hamas strategy. Hamas draws all its actions from the Mus-
lim tradition. Hamas legitimizes its activities with the necessity of defending Pal-
estine, which according to Hamas is an Islamic waqf, or foundation/trust, which is 
indivisible and belongs to all Muslims (a fact which should mobilize other Muslims 
to help). The article adds that the benefits of land belong to the people who inhabit 
it. Hamas refers to the opinion issued by the caliph ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Al-Khat-
tab, when asked by the leaders of the army conquering Iraq and Great Syria whether 
the land should be divided between the army or left to the original owners, responded 
that the land should be used by its inhabitants. Real ownership, however, belongs to 
all Muslims.33 Thus, we can see an attempt to reconcile the general Islamic position 
with the idea of land belonging to those who originally lived on and used it. Article 
12 directly concerns Hamas’s position on the idea of the nation and nationalism. The 
Charter argues that from Hamas’s point of view nationalism is a part of religious 
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ideology. The common denominator is jihad against an enemy on Muslim territory. 
Hamas places itself among other nationalist movements in this dimension. The Char-
ter describes Hamas as a nationalist movement that draws inspiration for its activities 
from the Muslim tradition. This movement rejects the peace debates, which have 
not led to a solution to the Palestinian problem. It compares the surrender of even 
a part of the Palestinian land to a loss of faith. Nationalism and religion complement 
each other as motivating factors. The liberation of Palestine is associated with three 
spheres: Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic. Each of them has a role to play in the fight 
against Zionism and none of them can be omitted. Thus, Hamas recognizes the mul-
tidimensional character of nationalism: it does not limit it to the Islamic dimension, 
but also includes the local cultural heritage and the wider Arab culture (article 14). 
Hamas’s ideological and political practice
Hamas has a loosely formulated political theory. According to Jeroen Gunning and 
Azzam Tamimi, the Hamas Charter was written by the old leadership and only a few 
leaders and ordinary members appealed to it in their political decisions.34 Hamas is 
primarily a civic movement; its documents are just a part of its activities and do not 
fully reflect the complexity of the movement. In the past the Muslim Brotherhood 
focused on charity in occupied Palestine.35 The public was familiar with their assis-
tance and organizational activities, which Hamas effectively used in its own policy. 
Hamas has never created a greater philosophical and ideological foundation. The 
political thought of Hamas is modified according to current needs. The concept of 
Hamas’s power derives from both Islamic and civic sources, which explains the exist-
ing tensions and contradictions in their political and social practices.36 Hamas mem-
bers differ in their opinions about the shape of the future Palestinian state. However, 
there are several fixed ideological points. The source of legislation is Shari’a (a draft 
constitution of the Palestinian Authority also has a provision that the rules of Shari’a 
are the main source of legislation).37 Hamas considers Shari’a as the general principle 
of operation, so it is not a sufficient source of law and must be supplemented by other 
legal traditions. Ahmed Yasin emphasized the importance of human experience in 
spheres in which Shari’a was not concrete enough. He believed that only the Shura 
Council (which would be elected by the nation), has the right to order, after public 
consultation, the introduction of Shari’a law as the basis of the legal system in the 
country.38
34 J. Gunning,  Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence, New York 2009, pp. 19–20; 
A. Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within, New York 2007, pp. 150–152.
35 J. Gunning, op. cit., pp. 470–484.
36 Ibidem, p. 56.
37 N.J. Brown, The Third Draft Constitution for a Palestinian State: Translation and Commentary, 
www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf [access: 26.07.2017].
38 J. Gunning, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
Hamas often defines the type of Islamic state it promotes as the “democracy of the 
Shura,” which can never be introduced by force.39 The methods that prepare the na-
tion for this form of government are education, consultation, and appropriate sociali-
zation. The nation must voluntarily agree to introduce such government. It is in this 
idea that we can see tensions between the declared freedom of individual choice and 
the policy of direct socialization. It is present between the will of citizens and the will 
of their elected representatives, between morality and state regulations. There is also 
a lack of consensus on the rights of non-Muslim citizens. Ahmed Yasin maintained 
that every human being is born free, and this freedom is guaranteed and protected by 
a specific religious and political system. Isma’il Abu Shanab, one of the three most 
influential members of Hamas, claims that the head of state represents a nation, not 
God.40 Hamas emphasizes that without appropriate socio-economic conditions and 
without the acceptance of Islamic law by the nation, Shari’a will not be introduced. 
However, as the power elected by the nation, Hamas is responsible for preparing 
society for the adoption of Islamic legislation. Abu Shanab adds that the national will 
cannot function without any restrictions (it is God’s will). At the preparatory stage, 
people still have the right to express their opposition to the use of, for example, the 
hudud laws, through referendum, consultation, or denying consent to the legislation 
process.41 
Opposition can be expressed when citizens recognize that they are not yet ready 
to exercise such a right. This attitude is a source of tensions between the theory and 
the social practice of Hamas. On the one hand, every citizen of a future state has the 
freedom to profess and practice any religion, while on the other, the individual is 
only free when he or she obeys the laws given by God.42
Hamas emphasizes the right of the nation to independence, because only a sover-
eign nation can freely decide about its character. Hamas ultimately does not shape the 
voter’s awareness; on the contrary, it has a rather limited influence on it, because it 
fears public criticism, especially in matters concerning Islamic practices. Palestinians 
often contest Hamas’s social and political decisions. For example, the civil police 
forbade women to smoke water pipes in public places, even though there was no le-
gal basis to do so. Shortly thereafter, the ban was removed due to social opposition.43 
Similarly, the ban on a book on Palestinian folklore (which according to Hamas was 
supposed to contain sexual content) Speak Bird, Speak Again, was rescinded, because 
this ban also met with public dissatisfaction.44 Hamas is often forced to modify or 
abandon decisions has made due to social disapproval. When Hamas criticized the 
39 Ibidem, pp. 59–60.
40 Ibidem, pp. 62–67.
41 R. Gaes,  Interview with Mousa Abu Marzook, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Interview+with+ 
Mousa+Abu+Marzook.-a019496510 [access: 26.07.2017].
42 Kh.  Hroub,  Hamas: Political Though and Practice, Washington 2000, pp. 85–86, 210–212; 
J. Gunning, op. cit., pp. 78–85.
43 Hamas Bans Women from Smoking Water Pipes in Gaza, http://www.haaretz.com/news/interna-
tional/hamas-bans-women-from-smoking-water-pipes-in-gaza-1.302631 [access: 10.02.2019].
44 Public Outcry Forces Hamas to Rescind Ban on ‘Sexual’ Folk Tale Book, http://www.haaretz.com/
news/public-outcry-forces-hamas-to-rescind-ban-on-sexual-folk-tale-book-1.215169 [access: 2.10.2019].
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Rafah agreement in 2005 on the mobility of Palestinians beyond the borders of the 
Palestinian Authority (signed by the Palestinian Authority, Israel, Egypt, and moni-
tored by the EU), Palestinians in Gaza reacted unfavorably, which forced Hamas to 
withdraw its objections.45 The same happened with the issue of the ceasefire in 2003, 
when Hamas began negotiations with Fatah. Seeing the need to increase public sup-
port for the party, Hamas agreed to the conditions set by Fatah.46 Palestinian society is 
not passive towards so-called Islamization. Hamas wants to appear as a real promoter 
of the Islamic national tradition, which can act on behalf of Palestinian Muslims and 
non-Muslims. It must therefore limit itself to the public will, whose importance is still 
underlined. Hamas has undergone ideological and political changes. Khaled Hroub 
in his article “A ‘New Hamas’ Through its New Documents” outlines a process that 
reveals Hamas as a more politically conscious party capable of compromising.47 In 
the election manifesto of 2005, Hamas presented eighteen different issues, all but two 
of which represent secular rhetoric. The electoral program contains specific national–
political proposals and issues and indicates the readiness of Hamas to compromise 
with other political factions of the Palestinian Authority.
However, in 2009 and 2010, it is possible to note the increased use of Hamas’s 
narrative and practices of Muslim tradition. When Fatah did not recognize Ha-
mas’s victory in the parliamentary elections in 2007, Hamas took control over the 
Gaza Strip and struggled to maintain it. The biggest political and social challenge for 
Hamas since then has been the various Salafi groups.48
Since 2007, Hamas has competed against and even clashed with more militarily 
oriented Salafi groups, also known as takfiri groups (takfir – recognition of an indi-
vidual or group as unfaithful). Hamas, in order to maintain its ideological authority, 
is working to maintain control over the mosques.49 Hamas sees a great threat to its 
authority with every accusation of weakness and failure in the implementation of 
Islamic law, hence it deals with these groups decisively.50
While focusing on the control of these groups, Hamas must preserve the legal 
and social order. A change in political and social practice followed Israel’s attack on 
the Gaza Strip in 2008. Salafists recognized this as the best time to undermine the 
authority of Hamas. Hamas combined security and order issues with the introduction 
of Islamic social regulations to stop the criticism of the competing groups.51 In this 
45 J. Gunning, op. cit., p. 156.
46 B. Milton-Edwards, A. Crooke, Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process, “Journal of 
Palestine Studies” 2004, no. 33 (4), pp. 39–52.
47 Kh. Hroub, A “New Hamas” through Its New Documents, “Journal of Palestine Studies” 2006, 
no. 35 (4), pp. 6–27. 
48 I. Qannan,  New Gaza Salafist faction numbers 11,000, http://www.maannews.net/eng/View- 
Details.aspx?ID=277513 [access: 27.07.2017]; Radical Islam in Gaza, “Crisis Group Middle East Re-
port” 2011, no.104; Kh. Hroub, Salafi Formations in Palestine…, op. cit., pp. 157–158. 
49 14 August Rafah Clashes: Analysis, Implications, & Recommendations, www.gaza-nso.org/files/
reports/files/10_5_2010_5222.pdf [access: 27.07.2017].
50 Radical Islam in Gaza…, op. cit.
51 Y. Sayigh, “We Serve the People” Hamas Policing in Gaza, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, 
Crown Paper no. 5, 2011, p. 38.
context, Hamas’s social thought proclaims that individual rights must be protected 
by maintaining order and social security based on Islamic tradition, especially that 
known and practiced locally by the Palestinians (‘urf).52 In the absence of strong state 
institutions (and under the imposed blockade by Israel), these actions are considered 
the best way to enforce the legal and social order. Hamas justifies its religious policy 
with its usefulness in establishing a security system.53
On 1 May 2017 Hamas presented their new Charter, Document of General Prin-
ciples and Policies.54 It is worth noting that the new Charter highlights the changes 
in the movement’s discourse and practices that have been occurring for years. Hamas 
interprets what it views as Islamic values in a dynamic way, as subject to change and 
evolution. For Hamas, as a resistance movement, Islamic values help preserve the 
nation’s culture, identity, traditions and human values in general. But Islam does not 
form the only basis of Hamas resistance and ideology. Moreover, Hamas executes 
a consultative decision-making process, and it manifests various social ideas. The 
Palestinian nation is always at the forefront of Hamas’s policy. As Klein argues, Ha-
mas is “Palestinianzing Islam,” not the other way around.55 Hamas incorporates, like 
Fatah but in different manner, three sources of identity: local (Palestinian), Arab, and 
Muslim. Palestinian Islam was to preserve the autonomy of the individual, cultural 
and political identity of all Palestinians. As Joas Wagemakers argues, Hamas showed 
their pragmatism within their Islamic framing and policing.56 Showing the various 
ways Hamas legitimized its actions between the second Intifada and the Gaza War, 
Wagemakers argues that this movement moderates its strategy and policy to not only 
react to changing circumstances, but also to constructively shape the social and po-
litical reality. He shows how in many cases Islam was not the main factor in those 
argumentations. The basis of the changes was always the Palestinian nation, its unity, 
resistance, and steadfastness. To present its readiness for diplomatic efforts, Hamas 
even created the idea of the so-called calming (tahdi’a),57 to maintain a period of 
peace with Israel. It was so in order to avoid using the term hudna,58 which is meant 
for longer time periods, since the idea of hudna with Israel has often been met with 
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aggressive reactions toward Hamas by Islamist groups. Hamas came up with that 
idea to show its readiness for diplomatic negotiations and trying to avoid conflict 
with other competing groups. It was a conscious and thoughtful step.59
Returning to the issue of the new Charter of May 2017, we can easily notice that 
it reiterates Hamas’s longstanding positions. It exhibits flexibility, leaving Hamas 
with the ability to moderate their position in the future. The document presents non-
religious definitions of Palestine and Palestinians, and Islam is mentioned in gen-
eral terms. In that, it very much resembles PLO’s 1968 Charter. Hamas insists they 
are resisting the Zionists, but not the Jews themselves. Hamas also articulates their 
consensus on the two-state solution, a very bold move on their part, considering the 
opposition they face from the Islamist groups, especially in the Gaza Strip. They see 
the historical Palestine as the nation’s heritage (especially in a cultural and historical 
context), but they consider establishing the Palestinian state along the 1967 borders 
with Israel. Moreover, they consider the right to resist the illegal Israeli occupation 
as a liberation struggle based on international law. On a national level they reaffirm 
national unity and partnership, and recognize PLO as a “national framework” for the 
Palestinians.60
Conclusions
As we can see, the secular demarcations between what Western scholars perceive as 
religious and socio-political spheres are inadequate. The Islamic values that Hamas 
adheres to are subject to interpretation, moderation, and change. Fatah, often de-
scribed by Western scholars as secular, often refers to Palestinian Islamic discursive 
tradition in their own policy and social actions. Palestinian national discourse has 
become a context for the development of Islam. It has its own logic, traditions and 
future goals. Islam cannot be separated from the social and political spheres; they 
complement each other. There is no Islamic exceptionalism or special relation be-
tween Islam and the political space. Palestinians refer to both the orthodox Islamic 
texts and practices, recognizing their own traditions that have developed over the 
centuries and influence their lives. That is why relegating Hamas to a non-nationalist, 
fundamentalist group, based only on their use of the Islamic tradition and neglecting 
their other discourses has resulted in a grave misunderstanding of their goals, policy, 
and ideology by many scholars and politicians. Hamas does not use the concept of 
“sacred authority” in their political language. The sovereign of the land is the people, 
the nation, and Islam is the main source of social and political values, which have the 
task of supporting and motivating Palestinian national rights and goals. Although 
Islam is not the only source of those values and rights, they fit within the Palestinian 
internal and external consensus.
59 J. Wagemakers, op. cit., pp. 357–377.
60 Hamas in 2017: The document in full, http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-charter- 1637 
794876 [access: 27.07.2017].
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Abstract
The issue of creating spaces dedicated to religious activities and that of the establishment of particu-
lar sections for Muslims at public cemeteries might be viewed as a single one. While researching 
mosques, one needs to accent the multi-functionality of the premises. The final shape of the interior 
and the exterior of the buildings can be understood as a result of internal and external influences. In 
the case of the establishment of cemetery fields, the observation of the processes of expert solu-
tions is important. In both issues the need of community organisation is displayed. Furthermore, the 
long-term construction of “otherness” in the European public space is in question. The discipline 
of Comparative Religious studies retains the possibilities to analyse the results of the research of 
Muslim communities and compare them with other examples (e.g., Jewish communities, small 
Christian churches or new religious movements). Thus issues concerning Islam can become a part 
of the wider discourse concerning secularisation and the deprivatisation of religion in Europe. The 
paper contributes to this discussion by pointing out the interconnection of needs of the Muslim 
population and manifestation of uniqueness in public space. 
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Introduction
The institutionalisation of Islam in Europe has been a long-term process, observable 
mainly from the twetieth century. This process has been an object of research of 
various scientific disciplines, such as History, Sociology, Political Science, and Reli-
gious studies. Many issues are examined in different disciplines by their own specific 
methodologies. That leads to the diversity of approaches of researchers. However, the 
